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GOVERNMENT HEALTH FINANCING IN INDIA: 
CHALLENGES IN ACHIEVING AMBITIOUS GOALS 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The government health financing landscape is changing fast in India. There is a strong 
political commitment at the highest level to increasing public spending on health from 
about 1% of GDP to 2-3% of GDP by 2012. In keeping with this goal, the central 
government has increased its health spending substantially in the last 3 fiscal years, 
mainly for the national flagship program, the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), 
that provides increased finances to states for existing programs as well as funding for 
several new initiatives. 
In India, states contribute the bulk of government health financing, which is in 
consonance with India’s constitutional decentralization whereby health is a ―state 
subject‖(Constitution of India). While the goal of 2-3% of GDP is voiced by the central 
government, achieving the goal would not be possible without the active involvement of 
states. Even if this commitment is center-led, which is implied in the strategy of raising 
the central share from less than 30% in 2005 to 40% in total government health spending 
by 2012, the states would still have to substantially increase their contributions to reach 
the goal. Given that the states’ role is crucial to achieving the goal, how credible is the 
overall commitment by the center? Do states attach the same priority to health as shown 
by the center? Even if, in principle, states attach similar priority, what demand does this 
goal places on state level funding? Can states mobilize the kinds of resources needed to 
achieve the goal? Furthermore, central government funding may not be wholly 
additional. States may partially substitute central funding for funding on their own 
account, thus somewhat offsetting GOI’s efforts to increase total government health 
spending. This may be exacerbated if states run into the constraint of spending additional 
funds given their limited capacities to implement programs. These are all interesting and 
pertinent issues to investigate. 
One articulation of the central government’s pledged increase in public spending on 
health in India has been the introduction in 2005 of the National Rural Health Mission 
(NRHM) (MoHFW 2005). NRHM is designed as an umbrella program – consolidating 
existing programs as well as adding some new ones – with a flexible, bottom-up 
perspective whereby district and village level health plans are aggregated up to the state 
level which are then annually submitted to and financed by the center, with some 
proposed matching of funds by the states to be introduced during the course of the 
implementation of the program. To what extent does NRHM expenditure currently 
impose, and will impose in future, financing obligations on the states? For example, 
improved facilities and increased access will need to be sustained in the future. Can the 
states sustain the financing of additional activities being undertaken under NRHM? 
Increasing of funding is one thing and effectively utilizing those funds is quite another. 
NRHM has a stated aim to not only increase financing of basic health care services in 
2 
rural areas of the country with a special focus on 18 lagging states
1
 but also improve 
efficiency and increase effectiveness of public investments in the health sector. As 
NRHM is focused mainly on improving primary care, the implementation of the program 
is expected to improve allocative efficiency of public health spending. Moreover, NRHM 
intends to bring about an ―architectural correction‖ to improve effectiveness of public 
health spending. Mechanisms for this include block grants to districts and local 
governments; demand-side financing for institutional deliveries (Janani Suraksha 
Yojana); public-private partnerships; and other innovations which districts and states can 
put forward for funding under new health plans. These innovative mechanisms exist 
alongside more ―traditional‖ mechanisms such as filling existing vacant but sanctioned 
posts, increased procurement of pharmaceutical and supplies, improved management 
information systems, and capacity-building for health managers. 
In this paper, we assess the implications of the stated government health financing goal, 
and the strategy of achieving the goal, in India’s federal system. Furthermore, now that 
NRHM is in its fifth year, we explore the early evidence on the substitution, sustainability 
and effectiveness of increased government health spending. The analysis in the paper 
shows that since states finance the bulk of government health expenditure in India, the 
proposed hike of health spending to 2-3% of GDP is unlikely to be realized by 2012 as 
this would entail increases in state health spending levels of implausibly high 
magnitudes. In addition, it is unclear the extent to which such increases in health 
spending will be sustained beyond 2012 especially from the perspective of the states. 
Even if one leaves the issue of resource increases aside, state-level absorptive capacity 
constraints and a potential substitution of state funds by central funds may further reduce 
the effective magnitudes of the proposed increases in health spending. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of health spending 
in India and examines the context that led to the political commitment to stepping up 
government health spending in India. Section 3 gets into the specifics of financing 
strategy to examine how realistic or unrealistic the health spending goal is, and what does 
it translate to in terms of resource commitments, both at central and state level. Section 4 
focuses on the actual experience with health allocations and spending post-NRHM. 
Analyzing early trends of NRHM financing, this section also brings out the challenges 
being faced in trying to increase government health spending in India. In particular, this 
section explores the issues of substitutability, sustainability, and effective utilization of 
government health funding since the launch of NRHM. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
1 The focus states include 10 large states (Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Jammu & Kashmir, 
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh) and eight northeastern states (Arunachal Pradesh, 
Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura).  Non-focus large states are: Andhra Pradesh, 
Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal. These three groups of 
states are also referred to as Group A, Group B and Group C states, respectively in the text. 
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HEALTH FINANCING OVERVIEW FOR INDIA 
 
Although total health spending in India at around 5% of GDP or US$40 per-capita is 
comparable to countries at similar levels of development, government health spending in 
India at 1% GDP or US$8 per-capita is comparatively low.
2
 Low public health spending 
is likely being compensated by high private health spending, over 90% of which comes 
from out-of-pocket payments by households.
 3
 The high share of out-of-pocket payments 
for health care imposes a large financial burden on households (Berman, Ahuja, and 
Bhandari 2009). Stepping up government health spending is expected to provide financial 
protection, especially to low-income households. 
The figure below shows the share of government health expenditure in GDP. The share 
of total government health spending shows a secular decline from over 1.1% in 1990 to 
less than 0.9% in 2005. This secular decline is mainly on account of the decline in 
government health spending at state level. The center’s share shows a marginal increase 
between 1990 and 2005. The year 2005, however, marks a turning point when the share 
of government health expenditure in GDP begins to rise. 
 
FIGURE 1: GOVERNMENT HEALTH EXPENDITURE, 1990-2007 
 
Given the low and declining share of government spending on health, the need for 
stepping up this spending had long been recognized but very little had happened by way 
of commitment or action until 2005 when the congress party-led United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) government came to power with the support of, among other parties, the 
                                                 
2 Unlike primary education in India which is funded through ―an education cess,‖ health care in India is supported 
through the general budget. India’s dependence on external assistance for health has traditionally been low relative to 
comparator countries. In 2006, for instance, only about 0.7% of total health spending (public as well as private) was 
externally sourced in the country. By way of contrast, in 2006-2007, average externally-financed share of health 
spending for all low-income countries was about 24.5% and for the South Asia region was 13.0%. 
3 There is significant variation in the public-private mix of health expenditures within the country: for example, the 
government share in total health spending was only 10.8% in Kerala while it was 26.6% in its neighboring state, Tamil 
Nadu (NCMH 2004). 
4 
Community Party of India (Marxist) that is known for its pro-social sector bias and hence 
favored social sector investments. In fact, stepping up social sector spending, including 
the health sector spending was one of the election promises of the UPA coalition. After 
the coalition came to power, the government launched a string of social sector programs 
of which NRHM was one.
4
 Although the reprioritization of health by the central 
government in India was largely driven by political change, acceleration in economic 
growth and the consequent increase in government revenues made funding of these 
programs possible. The central government’s focus on health is likely to continue 
following the Congress party’s 2009 election win. 
Indeed, economic growth tends to be associated with not only a higher overall level of 
resources but also a higher share of public resources devoted to health. There are several 
reasons why the government share of health spending tends to increase with income. 
Rising incomes are often associated with a greater demand for, and supply of, health care. 
Richer countries tend to have older populations with more non-communicable diseases 
and a greater need for chronic care, the relative price of health care rises with income 
driving up spending, and the revenue-collection capacities of governments increase with 
income, as do societal preferences for more government financing for health (ADB 
2006). However, India’s case has been anomalous in that despite years of strong 
economic growth India’s public health expenditure didn’t increase until there was also a 
strong political commitment. 
                                                 
4 For example, the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana which is a health insurance program for below-poverty-line (BPL) 
families; the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005 which provides for up to 100 days of guaranteed wage 
employment in rural areas for adult members of any household. 
5 
THE FINANCING IMPLICATIONS OF NRHM GOALS 
 
India’s Union (central) government has put forward specific plans to increase transfer of 
central funds to states via NRHM over the period 2005-2012.  We analyze the 
corresponding increase in state-level financing of health that would be required in order 
to meet the pledge of making government health expenditure be 2-3% of GDP by 2012 in 
India. 
Along with the overall government health financing goal of 2-3% of GDP, the central 
government spelled out the strategy for achieving this goal (MoHFW 2007). The salient 
features of the strategy are as follows:  
 Increased central funding for health is mainly through NRHM, which at the start of 
the program accounted for about 60% of the total funding by the health ministry 
(Berman and Ahuja 2008). 
 This increase is to be center-led as the center would increase its share in total 
government health spending from less than 30% to 40% by 2012. 
 The center would increase its allocation of NRHM by 30% per year for the first 
two years of the program and 40% per year thereafter until 2012. 
 Contributions by states to increasing government financing would amount to at 
least 15% of center’s NRHM allocations for each year over the period 2007-2012, 
although this currently foreseen only for the period 2008-2012. 
 An understanding that states would increase their health budgets by at least 10% 
per year in nominal terms. 
We do some analysis to see what these strategies imply. We work out three different 
scenarios. The assumptions common to all the three scenarios are that: (i) the central 
NRHM allocations from 2005-06 to 2011-12 increase as planned by the government; and 
(ii) the non-NRHM central allocations are assumed to grow at 10% per annum, beginning 
with budget allocations of 2005-06. The scenarios differ in terms of the growth in states’ 
health allocations to achieve a particular goal. The GDP figures considered are the actuals 
for the period 2005-06 and 2008-09, while for the period 2009-10 and 2010-11 the latest 
IMF forecasts for India are used (IMF 2009). For 2011-12, the growth is assumed to be 
13% (including 5% on account of inflation).
5
 
Scenario 1: With the assumptions above about increased center funding, if states 
increase their health allocations by 10% every year beginning with the budget allocation 
of 2005-06, we find that the total health allocations (center and states combined) will 
amount to only 1.33% of GDP by 2011-12, which will be much lower than the desired 
goal of at least 2%. Moreover, the share of center health allocations in total budget 
allocations would reach 52% by 2011-12, which is greater than the target of 40%. 
                                                 
5 The IMF forecasts are as given in the World Economic Outlook, July 2009. The IMF forecasts are for the calendar 
years, though. 
6 
Scenario 2: Given the assumptions on central health allocations, we estimate by how 
much states’ allocations need to grow in order to achieve the proposed center-state ratio 
of 40:60 in total government health allocations.  In comparison with Scenario 1, this 
means higher state allocations. We find that states’ allocations must grow by 22.2% every 
year beginning with the budget allocation of 2005-06. This would take the share of total 
government health allocations in GDP to 1.85% by 2011-12, actually quite close to the 
goal of 2%. Scenario 3: Given the assumptions on central health allocations, we analyze 
by how much states’ allocations need to grow in order to achieve the goal of 3% of GDP. 
We find that the growth rate comes to around 38% every year beginning with the budget 
allocation of 2005-06. This yields center-state ratio in total health allocations to be 25:75 
in 2011-12, much lower than the 40:60 target.
6
 
A study by the authors prior to the current financial crisis had highlighted the difficulty of 
achieving the 2% goal (Berman and Ahuja 2008). With the revised estimates of GDPs 
due to the current economic recession, the 2% would only be achievable (scenario 2) if 
states’ increase their health allocations by over 22% every year.7 This scenario (scenario 
2) is unlikely, considering the fact that the actual allocations so far have not kept pace 
with the planned central allocations and, moreover, the actual spending has been lower 
than the actual budget allocations. (Of course, the economic slowdown affects both the 
states and the center.) As we shall see later, there is also evidence of absorptive capacity 
constraints in the sector. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: PLANNED VERSUS ACTUAL CENTRAL NRHM ALLOCATIONS 
*1 crore = 10 million 
 
The Figure 2 above shows that there is already a significant gap between the planned 
central NRHM allocations and the actual NRHM allocations. If the trend is sustained, this 
gap will widen by the end of 2011-12.  It’s worth noting that non-NRHM central 
allocations have actually grown more quickly than projected, by almost 20% per annum 
in contrast to the 10% assumed in the above scenarios. This may reflect other competing 
                                                 
6 There is a slight double counting in the above analysis and the analysis later in the paper, on account of a small 
percentage of central NRHM funds flowing through state budget which gets captured twice: in central allocations as 
well as in state allocations.  
7 This also questions the usefulness of defining health financing goal as certain percentage of GDP. 
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7 
demands on central funds which are receiving attention, such as the development of new 
national tertiary care institutions (Duggal 2009). 
Can the states realize such large increases in health spending – to the order of 22-38% per 
annum as calculated above – so as to attain the central government’s goal of health 
spending being 2-3% of GDP by 2011-12?  
Going by the elasticity of government health spending to GDP, it is unlikely that 
government health spending would grow at the rate needed to achieve the goal of 2-3% 
of GDP. Using data from 1990-2007, the elasticity of overall (i.e., center and state) 
nominal government health spending to GDP in India was estimated to be about 0.94 
(Figure 3).
8
 This is low when compared with other countries: the average elasticity being 
1.16 for all low-income countries.
9
 There is a marked difference between the elasticity of 
central health spending versus aggregate state health spending to GDP in India: the 
former is much higher, to the order of 1.15 and close to the average for low-income 
countries, while the latter is only about 0.87 implying that state health spending has 
grown at a lower rate than GDP growth. 
 
FIGURE 3: CENTRAL AND STATE HEALTH EXPENDITURE SHARE OF GDP, 1990-2007 
 
Given the economic slowdown, revenue accruals of both central and states are likely to 
come down. With the decline in revenue resources of the central government, both tax 
devolution and non-plan grants by the center are beginning to decline (Ganguly 2009).  A 
countervailing factor is that as states implement the recommendation of the Sixth Pay 
Commission it will significantly increase their salary and pension bill with a likely higher 
proportional effect on health since it is a labor intensive sector. Increasing health 
spending through higher wages and benefits however does not translate into increased 
                                                 
8 An elasticity of 0.94 implies that a 1% increase in GDP is associated on average with a 0.94% increase in government 
health expenditure. 
9 This is based on data from 1995-2007. 
8 
effectiveness nor does it represent a higher priority being given by the states to health. It 
would, however, further squeeze the fiscal space available with the states for 
discretionary health spending. Against this backdrop increasing states’ health allocation 
by 22% every year in the next few years may prove to be difficult. 
9 
RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH BUDGETING AND SPENDING GOVERNMENT HEALTH 
ALLOCATIONS 
 
In this section we examine how the aggregate health sector allocations and spending have 
behaved particularly post-NRHM, and study the NRHM allocations and spending in 
some detail. 
It is important to clarify the terms we use here to analyze government health spending in 
India.  We use the term ―budgets‖ or ―allocation‖ to refer to planned spending amounts - 
what in India are called budget estimates.  These are often revised during each fiscal year 
based on revenues realized on other demands on fiscal resources.  NRHM is mostly a 
centrally-financed scheme, so it is possible to estimate the actual transfer of funds to the 
states – which we refer to as ―releases:.  The Center’s releases to the states are not the 
same as actual spending, since the states have in turn to spend the money.  We use the 
term ―utilization‖ to refer to reported actual spending, including that by the center 
directly and by the states and local government with devolved funds.  Data on releases 
and utilization often lags budget data by one or two years, making current analysis 
difficult.  
While the central and state health allocations have more than doubled in the four years of 
NRHM compared to 4 years preceding NRHM, the growth has not been as much as that 
envisaged to achieve the 2% goal. The average annual increase in central health 
allocations has been 21.1% during 2005-06 and 2008-09, while state allocations have 
increased on average by 16.3% per annum over the same period. The share of the center 
in total public health allocations has reached only 32% in 2008-09. NRHM accounted for 
almost 66% of total central health allocations in 2008-09. The average annual growth rate 
of NRHM budget allocation has been around 22% when it should have been over 30% 
per annum according to state plans. 
Health sector allocations disaggregated by year gives a richer account of the growth at 
center and state level. The central government health budget experienced dramatic 
growth from 10.7% in 2004-05 to 26.6% in 2005-06, and thereafter maintained a growth 
of over 20% in 2006-07 and 2007-08. The growth declined to 14.3% in 2008-09. The 
latest budget shows the central health budget up by 25.5% in 2009-10. Although the 
growth of the health budget is the result of government policy, the increases have been 
lower than envisaged. In looking at budget estimates made at the state level, a similar 
increase is observed, though the growth started not before 2005-06 and hovered around 
17% to 18%. The growth in states’ health budgets is lower than needed to achieve the 2% 
goal.  
10 
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FIGURE 4: GROWTH RATE OF HEALTH BUDGET ESTIMATES 
 
Figure 4 above decomposes this trend for the different groups of states. In this figure, 
Group A represents the average of 10 large NRHM focus states, Group B represents the 
average of 8 northeast states, and Group C represents the average of 10 large NRHM 
non-focus states (see footnote 1 for a list of states in Groups A, B and C).  The 
categorization of high focus states is made by NRHM norms, which allow for preferential 
treatment in allocations of NRHM funding, as well as relaxed norms for implementation 
of NRHM.
10
  We use this differentiation to assess if the introduction of NRHM in 2005 
had an observably varied impact on the state-wise allocations to the health sector between 
those NRHM focus and non-focus states. Between 2006-07 and 2007-08, growth in 
budget allocations to the health sector steadily decreased in Group A states, with 
increases seen again in 2008-09. While this is initial data, it is possible that an increase in 
central health allocations through the NRHM program may be the reason for the lowering 
of growth in state-wise health budget allocations.  Additionally, the growth rate as well as 
the variation in growth rates in Group C states is not as large as in the Group A states, 
where NRHM funding is larger. NRHM is intended to provide additionality to state 
budget allocations, and should not act as a substitute for already allocated state health 
funding. These trends raise concerns of potential substitution of state health funds with 
centrally allocated NRHM funding and should be monitored as additional data becomes 
available. In a recent press statement, the new health minister has expressed his concern 
over states not increasing their health budget and instead substituting central funding (HT 
2009). 
                                                 
10 The allocation of NRHM funds from the center to the states is primarily based on the 2001 population of each state. 
In addition to population, a weight has been assigned to priority states deemed to be in greater need of resources for 
health. High-focus non-northeastern states are assigned a weight of 1.3, high-focus northeastern states are assigned a 
weight of 3.2 and all other states have a weight of 1 (NRHM Framework 2006). 
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FIGURE 5: GROWTH RATE OF GOVERNMENT HEALTH SPENDING  
 
With regard to actual health spending rather than budget allocation, the information is 
available with some lag. State level information is available for the first two years of 
NRHM i.e., 2005-05 and 2006-07, and for the center the information is available also for 
the year 2007-08. As shown in Figure 5, there has been a distinct increase in both central 
and state health spending in the post-NRHM period compared with the years immediately 
preceding NRHM. In fact, growth in central spending started to increase in 2004-05—a 
year prior to NRHM reflecting response to years of low real spending growth and 
improved fiscal conditions in the states. However, in 2006-07, the growth in both central 
and states health spending slowed. This was probably due to capacity constraints which 
are now beginning to get addressed. Growth in spending is higher for Group A states than 
for the Group C states suggesting some evidence that the poorer states catching up with 
the better off states. 
It is important to note here that increased state health allocations and spending for at least 
some of the Group A states is in part due to the Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) 
grants.
11
 TFC identified seven most needy states and awarded them yearly grants for a 
period of 5 years from 2005-06 to 2009-10.
12
 These grants preceded the government’s 
statement of the objective reaching 2-3% of GDP. On a per-capita basis this grant on 
average amounted to Rs. 136.6 (or $2.7) but with significant variation among the selected 
states: from Rs. 348.3 (or $6.9) in Assam to Rs. 28.4 (or $0.6) in Madhya Pradesh (GOI 
                                                 
11 Inter-fiscal transfers in India occur through different channels. Whereas the Finance Commission – an independent 
authority appointed by the President every five years – has a mandate to decide how central revenues are to be shared 
across the states, there are other modalities of transfers: via the Planning Commission for funding planned development 
objectives and through center-state ministerial transfers which are funded wholly by the center (central sector projects) 
or those requiring states to cover a proportion of the costs (centrally sponsored schemes, such as NRHM). About two-
thirds of all center-state transfers are mandated via the Finance Commission with the remaining shared equally among 
Planning Commission and intra-ministerial center-state transfers (). 
12 These states are: Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. 
12 
2004, Berman and Ahuja 2008).
13
 The Thirteenth Finance Commission, which is in the 
process of submitting its recommendations to the Government of India, may provide 
additional grants for health, again, to the weaker states for achieving horizontal equity in 
health.  This is potentially another important source of strengthening states’ shares in 
government health spending which should be considered in the governments overall 
health financing strategy. 
NRHM Implementation and Absorptive Capacity 
 
Can NRHM deliver the increasing pace of implementation implied by its funding plan? 
Increased central funding for health under NRHM will require improved capacities 
especially at the district level and below. Absorptive capacity in states and districts 
reflects specific factors around the demand for and supply of service delivery. On the 
supply side, the constraints relate to inadequate infrastructure, limited technical, 
administrative and managerial capacities to plan and execute a program, and issues of 
incentives and accountabilities. On the demand side, lack of education, limited 
information, and socio-cultural factors pose constraints. 
NRHM’s design encourages bottom up planning, which can slow implementation. It also 
emphasizes strengthening public provision of health care with limited attention to trying 
alternate health service delivery models such as contracting out which could yield action 
more quickly. NRHM was rolled out on a national scale without having been piloted. As 
a result, the understanding of what it would take to implement the program is gradually 
building up as the program implementation gets underway. Some evidence suggests that, 
at least so far, NRHM allocations have exceeded absorptive capacities in many states. 
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FIGURE 6: RELEASES OF NRHM FUNDS AS PERCENT OF ALLOCATIONS 
 
                                                 
13 Using exchange rate: 1USD=Rs. 50. 
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An initial step in assessing the success of NRHM implementation is a simple expenditure 
analysis. Figure 6 shows the percent of total NRHM allocations at the state level that are 
actually released. The data highlight that release levels are far below allocations in all 
three groups of states. Furthermore, in Group A states, releases as a percent of allocations 
have decreased over time. As allocations are rising (even though, not fast enough to keep 
up with the envisaged plan), the proportion of that amount actually released to the states 
is not showing a similar increase. This suggests a problem with the states either in 
complying with the modalities involved in the release of the funds or in their capacity to 
absorb the allocated funds. 
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FIGURE 7: UTILIZATION OF NRHM FUNDS AS PERCENT OF RELEASES 
 
Figure 7 shows the percent of total NRHM releases at the state level that are actually 
spent. Expenditures on NRHM as a share of releases have steadily increased in all three 
groups of states between 2005 and 2007.  It is not surprising that initially states were not 
spending a large portion of NRHM funding releases. It can take time for a program such 
as NRHM to become established and the appropriate management and procedural 
structures to be put into place.  While expenditure levels remain well below release 
levels, the steady increase in utilization of funds shows an increased implementation 
capacity within the NRHM program. There does not appear to be large differences 
between the groups of states in their ability to spend the released funding for NRHM. 
However, in Group A states, given the decrease in releases as a share of allocation, 
expenditures as a share of total allocations increased from 32% in 2005-06 to only 41% 
in 2007-08. Thus, while Group A states get lower releases relative to the planned 
allocations under NRHM, these states on average have been better able to spend the 
money that was released. 
The special treatment of Group A states is intended to compensate for relative inequities 
between those states with higher income per capita and better health outcomes, and 
poorer states with worse health outcomes. However, examining NRHM allocations as 
14 
well as actual spending, we do not find much difference between Group A and  Group C 
states. Total NRHM expenditure during 2005-08 per rural population was approximately 
Rs 167 in non-focus large states and only Rs. 163 in high focus non-northeast states.
14
 It 
is instructive to note here that even NRHM allocations per rural population do not differ 
much either between Group A and Group C states. Aggregate NRHM allocations for 
2005, 2006, and 2007 were Rs 353 per rural population in Group A states and Rs 342 in 
Group C states. Even though NRHM tries to improve equity by making higher per-capita 
allocations to focus states, these allocations are not significantly higher on the basis of the 
rural population size for whom the program is ostensibly designed. 
Disaggregation of NRHM funding into major sub-categories yields some additional 
insights. Most new activities under NRHM fall under the NRHM flexible pool, while 
other three sub-categories –- RCH flexipool, National Disease Control Program (NDCP), 
and Immunization – all existed prior to NRHM, but have now been subsumed and given 
higher allocations under NRHM. The data in Figure 8 below are the average release as a 
percent of allocations. NRHM flexipool consistently has the highest rate of releases as a 
share of allocations across all three groups of states. This rate is above 100% in all cases. 
Immunization releases also exceed allocations in Group A and B states, whereas releases 
for RCH flexipool and NDCP are well below allocations.  
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FIGURE 8: RELEASE OF NRHM FUNDS AS PERCENT OF ALLOCATIONS BY MAJOR SUB-CATEGORIES 
 
Figure 9 below show the average actual expenditures as a percent of releases between 
2005-06 and 2007-08. 
                                                 
14 Total NRHM expenditure for 2005, 2006, 2007 for the different state groups divided by total rural population of 
those states in 2006.  
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FIGURE 9: UTILIZATION OF NRHM FUNDS AS PERCENT OF RELEASES BY MAJOR SUB-CATEGORIES 
 
Despite the high rate of releases to NRHM flexipool, expenditures as share of these 
releases are consistently low in all three groups of states. Group A states have the lowest 
rate of expenditures, at just 32% on average.  Even though, Group C states are the best 
able to spend the money released to them for NRHM flexipool, their utilization rate is 
less than 60%. In a way, the gap between the release and actual spending under NRHM 
flexible pool, which consists of new set of activities, is understandable. But significant 
gap in other ongoing sub-categorizes is suggestive of real limits on execution capacity of 
all states, suggesting the need to focus on capacity building of the states to ensure 
effective utilization of the NRHM funds.
15
 
Is Increased NRHM Spending Improving Health Programs?  
 
NRHM’s purpose is to improve health outcomes in rural populations, with a particular 
focus on primary care. It is too early to link NRHM expenditures to health outcomes 
definitively. However, given the large focus of NRHM on reproductive and child health, 
in particular, on making incentives payments for promotion of institutional deliveries, it 
may be worthwhile to examine the impact NRHM has had on the percentage of women 
delivering babies in an institution. We utilize recently released DLHS-3 survey data for 
this analysis. Figure 10 shows the change in the percent of institutional deliveries 
between 2002-2004 and 2007-2008 versus total RCH expenditures per rural population 
made between 2005 and 2007 under NRHM.  We see that there is a positive correlation 
between the amount of RCH funding per rural population and the increase in institutional 
deliveries. One could infer that NRHM is potentially contributing to the increase in 
institutional deliveries. However, when we disaggregate this trend, we observe that 
Group A states are not necessarily doing better than Group C states in improving the 
                                                 
15 The NRHM funds that are released but not utilized continue to remain with the states/districts. The unspent balances 
lying with states/districts are taken into account in the release in the subsequent period. 
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percentage of institutional deliveries. This could be interpreted as raising doubts about 
the causality between NRHM and improved institutional deliveries or perhaps NRHM is 
helping lower performing states approach the level of the better performing states. We 
also compare RCH expenditures per capita to the percentage change in institutional 
deliveries and found a similar positive trend, but that Group A states had higher changes 
than Group C states. This larger percentage change may be due to the initially much 
lower levels of institutional deliveries in 2002-2004 in Group A. These results are 
somewhat promising with regard to institutional deliveries. A similar correlation does not 
exist when comparing the immunization pool of NRHM expenditures and the change in 
the percentage of children receiving full immunizations. 
 
FIGURE 10:  RCH POOL PER RURAL POPULATION VERSUS CHANGES IN PERCENT OF INSTITUTIONAL DELIVERIES, 2002-
2007 
 
Analysis of the actual use of NRHM expenditure in several states suggests that these 
funds are being used for variety of purposes and on variety of activities which were either 
unfunded or underfunded prior to NRHM demonstrating at least the intent that these 
expenditures be additional. Since NRHM activities are largely complementary to the pre-
existing service delivery programs, the intent is clearly to increase the effectiveness of 
government health service delivery although we cannot demonstrate that causal 
relationship with evidence of improvement outputs.  
Table 1 below shows NRHM expenditure on 3 major heads viz., RCH Flexi-pool, NRHM 
flexi-pool and Immunization during 2008-09 as reported by the states. Besides these three 
heads, expenditure under NRHM includes expenditure on two other heads namely, 
national disease control programs and infrastructure maintenance. Funding to the latter 
two heads has been going on even prior to NRHM. What’s really new to NRHM are the 
activities in NRHM flexi-pool and, to some extent, under RCH flexi-pool. Around 58% 
of all NRHM allocations to Group A, B, and C states in 2008-09 went to the 3 heads 
shown in table below. A significant part of NRHM expenditure occurred under the two 
flexi-pools. Expenditure on promotion of institutional deliveries through cash payments 
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to expectant mothers and accompanying health workers, Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), 
takes a sizable part of expenditure under RCH pool. Likewise, significant expenditure is 
being made on a number of new activities such as selection and training of village health 
activist called ASHA, untied grants to health facilities to allow flexible funding of local 
needs, physical up-gradation of health facilities, corpus grants to patient welfare societies 
at the facility level and so forth. Most of these expenditure items are expected to support 
improvements in existing service delivery which were not financed by the states 
previously. (Upgradation to physical facilities is one exception to this) Note that the total 
expenditure under the major heads is higher than the amount released which is due to 
unspent balances lying with the states. 
  Table 1: NRHM Expenditure during 2008-09 (In Rs. Crores) 
 State Groups 
Expenditure Items Group 
A 
Group 
B 
Group  
C 
    
1. RCH Flexi-pool, of which 1687.7 215.4 898.2 
     Janani Suraksha Yojana 
(JSY) 
964.0 72.1 203.3 
2. Mission Flexi-pool, of 
which 
1138.2 633.5 1840.1 
    ASHA (selection, 
training, kits) 
135.2 17.6 99.6 
    Untied Funds 204.9 42.0 266.8 
    Hospital Strengthening 67.8 84.8 324.9 
    Annual Maintenance 
Grants 
44.8 10.7 63.3 
    Corpus Grants to 
RKS/HMS 
72.3 12.6 89.2 
    Additional Contractual 
Staff 
94.8 63.4 94.8 
3. Immunization 372.3 35.3 120.8 
    
Total Expenditure 3198.2 884.3 2859.1 
Total Releases 2960.0 677.7 1972.1 
Source: NRHM Website: http://www.mohfw.nic.in/NRHM.htm 
 
One area where NRHM could innovate to improve the linkage between increased 
spending and results would be to tie expenditures more to measured increases in outputs 
and outcomes. Specifically, all three types of innovative grants viz., untied grants, 
maintenance grants, and grants to facility level ―patient welfare committees,‖ are based 
on input-related norms as opposed to performance in terms of outputs. Increased 
spending, linked to inputs, is expected to support local level decision making to 
improving health service delivery. NRHM should consider how to link these innovative 
grants to outputs like quality-adjusted patient load or population coverage to improve 
18 
results. Given the gaps between allocations, releases, and actual expenditures, there is 
probably some room for bonus payments tied to performance. 
Likewise, there are certain processes which are posing bottlenecks in the smooth 
implementation of NRHM. For example, since the NRHM funds are routed through state 
health societies and not through the conventional treasury mechanism, the current system 
of linking release of funds to the checks and balances in the utilization of funds could be 
improved.
16
 The current method of releasing funds does not make a distinction between 
recurring expenditure and capital expenditure. Very often, utilization certificates for 
capital expenditure are furnished with some lag which delays release of central funds (for 
both capital and recurring expenditures) which in turn adversely affects recurring 
expenditures to be incurred by states. Rationalization of such processes could enhance the 
program implementation. 
                                                 
16 The first tranche (up to 75%) of approved central outlays is released on receipt of provisional utilization certificate of 
the funds released during previous year, taking into account the unspent balance lying with a state. The second tranche 
of 25% is released after the receipt of audited statements and audited utilization certificates for the funds released 
during previous year. This process of fund release conditional on the submission of utilization certificate does not 
distinguish between capital and recurring expenditures.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
By setting a goal of increasing government health spending to 2-3% of GDP and 
launching its ambitious National Rural Health Mission, the GOI has expressed a strong 
commitment to health. Government health spending has indeed increased. This focus on 
health is likely to continue following the Congress party’s 2009 election win. 
However, fulfilling this commitment has implications for both center and state funding of 
health care in India. The analysis presented in the paper suggests that given India’s 
decentralized governance – with a large share of government health spending occurring at 
the state level – realizing the goal of 2-3% of GDP would require that states on aggregate 
would need to increase spending on average by 22-38% per year to attain this target. 
Achieving this target is unlikely, both because of the fiscal implications of such large 
increases as well as the difficulties in actually spending rapidly increased budgets.  
From the available data, we see that the states have not been able to fully utilize 
additional funding provided by the central government, slowing NRHM implementation. 
The constraints are primarily related to the states’ capacities to scale up the program at 
the pace initially planned. They include cumbersome procedures slowing fund 
disbursements; lack of availability of additional inputs such as human resources; weak 
motivation; and weak capacities to plan and execute plans.  NRHM was rolled out 
nationwide, more or less in one go without piloting the program. A number of key 
NRHM actions, such as ASHA recruitment and training, were developed as 
implementation proceeded. Focused assessment on these issues, for example, b 
comparing districts with better and worse NRHM implementation in the same states, 
would improve understanding of how to accelerate NRHM scale-up. 
There is some preliminary indication that scaled up NRHM spending may be improving 
health service programs and coverage, possibly helping reduce gaps between lagging and 
more advanced states. NRHM is designed both to strengthen existing infrastructure as 
well as add capacity for better service delivery. Much more analysis of the contribution 
of these additional inputs is important for enabling greater realization of this potential. 
Greater emphasis on innovative ways to link increased government funding to better 
performance could also help increase results.  
In a federal fiscal structure such as India’s, a rapid increase in funding from one source of 
government spending, in this case the center’s budget, can lead to unintended 
consequences in other sources of government spending such as the states. We continue to 
be concerned that  NRHM’s dependence on central grants may  create incentives to states 
to reduce their own health expenditures, especially on lower level services. NRHM tries 
to address this problem through conditionality, i.e. requiring states to increase their own 
spending at a specified rate in tandem with increased central funding. However, given 
India’s complex government financing structures, these conditions are difficult to 
monitor. States have discretion over the budget allocations as well as disbursements. 
With flexible grants to states they also may have some discretion on whether to use 
center or state funds for specific expenditure. The center’s ability to monitor some of 
these results may be delayed by government accounting processes. The evidence 
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available so far suggests that some degree of substitution has appeared in aggregate, with 
variation across individual states.  This issue bears close monitoring, especially with the 
advent of some economic slowdown which will certainly impact state budgets. NRHM’s 
laudable goal of significant increases in government health spending should not be 
vitiated by fiscal gaming between different levels of government.  
A longer-term issue concerns India’s strategy for government financing of health. The 
center’s plans as currently outlined in the 11th Five Year Plan envisages a substantial 
increase in the total share of the center’s financing of government health expenditure as 
overall government expenditure increases.  Yet the states remain the owners and 
operators of almost all of the government health care delivery system. If NRHM (as well 
as the proposed National Urban Health Mission) are successful, one result will be a major 
increase in the volume of services provided by the government health care facilities, with 
related increases in recurrent costs such as those for drugs and supplies and future human 
resources costs. Will the center continue to support increased state-level spending? 
Would this be done through plan mechanisms as it is now or non-plan mechanisms? Or 
will states be expected to significantly increase their own plan or non-plan spending 
when the current mission ends?  
Government of India should be credited with reversing a long trend of declining 
government effort to address health problems. It has coupled action to increase budgets 
with an ambitious goal – doubling or tripling government health expenditure as a percent 
of GDP. Having an explicit financing goal has value in political terms, when the 
government is spending very little on health care. However, it is also important is to 
ensure that the additional financing indeed gets allocated and spent, and gets spent 
effectively on buying the right kind of outputs and outcomes consistent with government 
stated priorities. The evidence to date indicates that a commitment to increasing 
government health spending may be necessary but is not sufficient to achieve the 
government’s goals. The absorptive capacity in the states, that is, the capacity to plan and 
implement, is an important constraining factor. India’s experience brings out rather well 
that just committing resources is not enough. Resource commitment for health must go 
hand-in-hand with the capacity to utilize those resources effectively, which calls for 
addressing existing inefficiencies, trying alternative approaches to service delivery, and 
possibly a greater focus on outputs and outcomes. 
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